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Claude C. Albritton. Jr. has brought 
together 15 papers written between the 
years 1785 and 1970. One thing they 
have in common is that they all touchon 
some aspect of philosophy and of 
Geohistory, but otherwise they should 
be broken down into three or four 
groups. The first group of papers was 
written before, during and immediately 
after the French Revolution when the 
philosophical issue of the immanence or 
lack of immanence of God in the 
creation of the world was being worked 
out. There is a selection from Hutton, 
from Playfair, from Lyell and from 
Whewell which take us into the thick of 
the battle using the words of the 
scientists themselves. Unfortunately the 
catastrophists are not represented at all, 
except half-heartedly by Whewell. 
Philosophers are notoriously sloppy 
about dates and geologists talk in terms 
of thenearest million years, but it bothers 
an historian nf science to see the date of 
Lyell's contribution given as 1872, when 
in fact, it was written forty years earlier. 
Again, Albritton takes his selection from 
the 1872 edition of Whewell'sHislory of 
the Inductive Sciences, when, in fact, it 
had been written thirty-five yearsearlier. 
In 1872. Whewell was long since dead 
and Lyell nearly so. These dates are 
significant if one subscribes to the 
structure of scientific revolutions as 
outlined by Kuhn. 
Kuhn claims that major philosophical 
issues are hammered out in the pre- 
paradigm stage of the science or during 
a scientific revolution. Once worked out. 
scientists take these philosophical 
presuppositions for granted and 
"articulate the paradigm" by means of 
sophisticated research techniques. 
Kuhn reasons that if scientists had 
continued to argue over fundamentals. 
science would never have proceededto 
its highly sophisticated stage of 
development; it would have remained, 
like philosophy, in a state of endiessand 
unfruitful debate. Thus for Albritton to 
give Lyell's paper the date of 1872 and 
Whewell's paper the same date, is to 
suggest that the debate over 
fundamentals was still going on 
throughout the 19th Century, which is 
misleading. The debate over the 
Immanence of God was going on among 
theologians and among philosphers, but 
geologists had long since passed on to 
the normal stage of development, 
spending their time making geological 
surveys, mapping the course of 
railroads, searching for mineral deposits 
and articulating the uniformitarian 
paradigm in very specific ways. 
When a science passes out of the pre- 
paradigm, or revolutionary stage into 
what Kuhn calls "normal" science, the 
philosophical interest of its practitioners 
passes from questions about the nature 
of God. or the nature of nature-that isto 
say passes from questions about 
fundamentals to questions of 
methodology. In the paradigm stage 
methodology becomes all important 
because the inculcation of the proper 
method in younger scientists is the 
means by which the perpetuation of the 
paradigm is insured. The introduction of 
new methods is always greeted with 
suspicion because new methods stand 
in danger of turning up not only newdata, 
but new kinds of data. The "correct" 
method is one that insures the young 
practitioner that he will uncover the 
"Truth"; it is the method by which the 
founders of the science had uncovered 
the truth, or are alleged to have 
uncovered the truth, and so it is the 
method that must at all times be used, 
Actually, a rig~d methodology, like a rigid 
liturgy, insures conformity, which is 
taken as the same thing as truth. All 
normal sc~entific methodologies stress 
some form of empiricism because facts 
have never led to a revolution in science. 
Facts are safe. Every scientific 
revolution 01 any consequence - the 
Copernlcan. Newtonian. Lyellian, 
Darwinian, Lavoisierian, Einsteinian. - 
have been made by the reinterpretation 
of oldfacts, not by the discovery of new 
ones. The second group of papers in 
Albritton's volume concern 
"methodology", and are written in the 
period 1890 to the present, when the 
uniformitarian paradigm is well 
established. Typical of these papers is 
one by W. M. Davis (1 926) on "The Value 
of Outrageous Geological Hypotheses." 
What is so amusing about this paper is 
that the"outrageous" hypothesis he 
proposes, is fully in conformity with the 
uniformitarian paradigm, as are those 
used to illustrate the papers by 
Chamberlin. Gilbert. Johnson. Mackin 
and Anderson, all of which professed to 
encourage free inquiryand wild 
speculation, while doing, in fact, lust the 
opposite. 
The last group of papers have albeen 
written since 1962 and represent 
modern reflection on the phiiosophical 
(as opposed to methodological) 
implications of geology. This group can 
be divided again into two parts: those 
reflecting back on the original 
uniformitarian debate, and thoselooking 
on geological issues from the 
perspective of logical positivism. 
There is a paper by M. K. Hubbert. on 
the "Critique of the Principle of 
Uniformity", which is amazing not Only 
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fa the clarity of its wriiing,foritsgraspof 
the philosophical issues of modern 
science, but also for its very competent 
handling of the history of geology. If you 
have time to read one article in the book. 
read this one. It is followed by one written 
by G. G. Simpson, who is every bit 
Hubbert's match in intellect, but unlike 
Hubbert, has completely botched the 
historical end of things. He argues that 
Darwin's theory of evolutionemerged as 
much from Cuvier's catastrophism as it 
did from Lyell's uniformitarianism, onthe 
grounds that Lyell believed in a steady 
state model of the universe while Cuvier 
allowed for successive progessive 
creations. Poor Darwin must be either 
rolling over in hisgrave, or having a good 
laugh - I suspect the latter. Actually if 
Simpson had read Darwin's notebooks. 
he would have learned that Darwin was 
not really interested in evolution as such. 
nor really in "progress" except as a 
means to an end. Darwin never usesthe 
word "evolution." he uses the word 
"descent" or "transmutation". 
"Evolution" was used by Auguste 
Comte, and was later superimposed on 
Darwin's theory. Darwin was interested 
primarily in establishing that God did not 
interfere arbitrarily in the universe, but 
ruled by means of law: "Astronomers 
might formerly have said that God 
ordered each planet to move in its 
particular destiny. In same manner God 
orders each animal created with certain 
form in certain country, but how much 
more simple and sublime". Darwin 
writes on page tot of his first 
Transmutation Notebook. "let attraction 
act according to certain law, such are 
inevitable consequences - let animal be 
created, then by the fixed laws of 
generation, such will be their 
successors. Let the powers of 
transportal be such, and so will be the 
forms of one country to another. - Let 
geological changes go at such arate, so 
will be the number and distribution of the 
species!!" (Darwin's exclamation). Note 
the biblical phraseology. Darwin was 
trained asan Anglican priest. His"treeof 
life" metaphor was taken from the Book 
of Revelation, and the above passage 
was Darwin's rephrasing of the first 13 
chapters of the Book of Genesis; in 
wrltingthis. as in all his writings, he was 
directly attacking the position of 
Georges Cuvier, which brings us backto 
the 14th article in Albritton's volume. 
wrltten by the Dutch Reform geologist. 
historian and philosopher. Reijer 
Hooykaas. "Catastrophism in Geology. 
Its Scientific Character in Relation to 
Actualism and Uniformitarianism". 
Coming from a religious background 
himself. Hooykaas understands better 
the theological issues surrounding the 
early history of geology and hence is a 
good deal more historically accurate 
than is Simpson, although from a 
modern geological standpoint, not so 
perceptive as Hubbert. 
If we stand back for a moment from 
this battle that has been raging now for 
more than twenty years between 
Hooykaas and Simpson and view it with 
some perspective, we find that the issue 
involves more than an academic 
argument, but two completely divergent 
interpretations of the nature of science 
itself: does science develop purely by 
internal methodological procedures, or 
is the development of a science caught 
up in the wider intellectual history of the 
era? 
If you believe that science is 
autonomous, then it is necessary to 
argue that Cuvier, a scientist, and Lyell, a 
scientist, and Darwin, a scientist, are all 
waking towards a common end: the 
accumulation of knowledge. They might 
be rivals, but they cannot be enemies. It 
is natural then for Simpson to suppose 
that Darwin drew from Cuvier as he had 
drawn from Lyell in the foundations of his 
thought, and that the theory of evolution 
was a purely internal scientific matter 
completely independent of the issues 
being fought over during the French 
Revolution. 
The opposite position to that of 
Simpson, Eiseley, and the "cumulative 
truth" school, is that of the Frankfurt 
School, which argues that all "truth" 
including scientific "truth", is mere 
Social projection of the class structure in 
society used to oppress the masses. 
Herbert Marcuse is the most influential 
member - influential particularly among 
radical graduate students of Sociology. 
as is Max Horkheimer and Theodor U. 
Adorno (see Martin Jay, The Dialectical 
Imagination). 
As usual the true truth lies half way in 
between: There are some scientists who 
operate entirely within the given 
paradigm and who never question 
fundamentals, just gather data: but we 
do not hear much of them; they tend to 
be second rate: then there are those who 
are only interested in articulating their 
own religious or philosophical point of 
view, andlinle is heardofthem except on 
the street corner or in bars: if we 
examine closely the notebooks of the 
really great scientists - the Lyells, the 
Darwins, the Newtons, the Einsteins, we 
discover that they all had very strong 
religious, political and philosophical 
points of view, but that they also went 
through agonies to reconcile their 
philosophy with current scientific data. 
The great scientists are not great 
discoverers, but great reconcilers of 
man, a social animal, and the natural 
environment in which he lives. 
There are two more articles in 
Albrinon's book that I would like to 
mention before closing; one, by Toulmin. 
opens the volume: the other, by Kitts, 
closes it. Both areon Geological "Time". 
When the Uniformitarian debate was 
Closed in the 1840s by assimilation of 
Louis Agassiz's ice ages, and geologists 
took tothe fields to guide railroads 
across Europe. Asia and America to 
carry back minerals for the great 
industrial revolution, the issues which 
uniformitarianism raised, did not die, but 
passed first to Natural History with the 
appearance of Charles Darwin's theory 
about the Origin of Species, and then 
passed to physics with the publication of 
Einstein's theory of relativity in 1905. 
17th Century Protestants had argued 
that God had created each species and 
then had interrupted the normal laws of 
nature at the time of thedelugeto punish 
man for his sins. Lyell had placed 
Geology beyond the realm ofthe deluge. 
and had eased God out ofthe creation of 
species slightly. He granted that God 
createdthe basic species, butthatthese 
species radiated out into new varieties. 
Lyell believed that there was, however,a 
limit tothe variation possible, and if the 
species was forced to try to exceed the 
limit by changes in the earth, the species 
became extinct. 
Darwin took the process of easing 
God out of the universe one stepfurther. 
In a book with a purposely ambiguous 
title: On the Origin of Species, heargues 
that the limitation placedonthevariation 
of species by Lyell is not warranted, and 
that species can vary indefinitely away 
from the original type. In his notebooks, 
Darwin warns himself not to attempt too 
much, not tofall intothetrapLamarckfell 
into by proposing to explain how a snail 
could transform itself into a porcupine. In 
the Origin of Species and in Var~ations of 
Animals and Plants under 
Domesticalion, he talks about the origin 
of species from a closely related 
species. He leaves the origin of classes. 
orders, and genera to the imagination of 
the reader. If the reader was religiously 
inclined, as was Asa Gray, he could 
leave the origin of higher taxa to God, or 
if he were atheistically inclined, as was 
Haeckel, he could eliminate God 
altogether. There was, at any rate, room 
enough for philosophical and 
theological discussion, and, indeed. the 
later part ol the 19th Century was filled 
with it. 
Positivists, however, were clear that 
God had no place in science, and Ernst 
Mach, the Austrian physicist, who had 
been flunked out of school by theJesuits 
and told to become a carpenter, set 
himself the task of rigorously stripping 
science of all concepts which had a 
theological or even philosophical 
foundation. The concept of "law", which 
Newlon had so successfully used, and 
which Darwin had soardently cultivated, 
Ernst Mach on the other hand mightily 
despised. Newton, a fundamentalist, had 
believed that God had directly 
promulgated the three laws ol motion. 
but Mach argued that a so called "law" in 
science was nothing more, and nothing 
less, than an "economical description of 
observational data". Einstein. following 
Mach, pointedly avoided using the term 
"law" altogether and hence we have the 
"principle" of relativity instead of the 
"law" of relativity. 
In Vienna, there arose a school ol 
logical positivism, who were direct 
followers of Mach, and who attempted to 
systematically examine terms used in 
science tosee what they actually meant. 
terms like "time", "space", "hypothesis" 
and "law". These were terms which 
scientists tended to use without ever 
really defining them, and it was in these 
terms that "extrascientific" concepts, 
like"god", crept in. However, when the 
logical positivists attempted to define 
rigorously these scientific concepts. 
they ran into problems. To define one 
word, you must use another word, which, 
in turn, needs to be defined, and so on 
~ndefinitely. Finally Godel showed that 
sooner or later you must begin with an 
undefined term, or, more accurately, you 
must begin with a term which is not 
delined by science or philosophy, but 
whose meaning is assumed through the 
historical experience of using it in the 
community. Hence Toulmin has argued 
that to understand the philosophy of 
science, you must understand the 
history of science. If you want to know 
what the word "time" means, you have to 
go back through history and understand 
the historical context in which the 
accepted usage of the word developed. 
We have now come full circle. The 
original concepts of Geology emerged 
not Only trom an empirical study of 
nature. but also from the historical 
experience of Western Europe in the 
17th, 18th and 19th Centuries. In using 
these terms to describe Nature, the 
original geologists were not able to 
escape their involvement in the social. 
political and theological events around 
them - nor are we, or if wedo escape, it is 
at the peril both of science and of 
society. 
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The declared object of this book is to 
provide an introduction to the study of 
crystalline sol~ds for students in a first 
year course; a number of more 
advanced sections have been included 
to appeal to students in a second year of 
crystallographic study The authors also 
propose that 11 may appeal l o  graduate 
students who have come to 
crystallography from other d~scipl~nes 
We cons~der these object~ves too 
extensive for a treatment satisfactory to 
any of the classes of subjects it is 
Intended for 
In fact, weconsiderthe book unique in 
11s breadth: crystal morphology, atom~c 
structure. X-ray crystallography, crystal 
chemistry, crystal phys~cs, optics. 
thermodynamrcs, analytrcal chemrstry 
are all Included and treated in a 
reasonably comprehensive manner 
The illustralions are generally clear 
Wh~lethe development of spec~fictop~cs 
IS admittedly not rigorous, it does 
nevertheless convey a physlcal 
unde:stand~ng ol the subject. The 
incluslon of thermodynamics (Part 11) is 
certainly unusual in an inlroductory text 
to crystallography: much of this part of 
the text is concerned w~th classrcal 
thermodynamics and the tle w~th 
crystallography via statistical 
thermodynamics 1s indeed very tenuous. 
As a tool of learning in the hands of 
l~rst or second year students. we feel that 
the Inclusion Of exercises on thevarious 
topics would have been very helptul we 
did not see any. The book may be more 
successful as a reference manual 
The number of Introductory texts in 
crystallography publ~shed in English is 
considerable. Th~s one is unlque for its 
breadth: at the current prlce. ~ t s  
acqulsitlon asa reference manual would 
appear interesting to us 
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